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This paper uses Aristophanes' Lysistrata to draw out the central violent tension of the weaving 
paradigm in Plato's Statesman. In the Lysistrata, weaving is offered as a metaphor for a tyrannical 
refashioning of the polis. In strikingly similar terms, the Eleatic Stranger of the Statesman proposes 
weaving as a metaphor for the best form of government. What is laughed off in the play, the characters 
of Plato's dialogue seem to take seriously. Through a comparative reading, I argue that the 
interpretations of the Statesman that take weaving as a paradigm for the best government of state, not 
only miss the comedy in the Stranger's discussion of statesmanship, but also the tragic allusions to 
tyranny. Furthermore, by drawing out the dialogue’s resonance with comedy, I conclude that the 
weaving paradigm succeeds in giving us a means for identifying tyranny in the Statesman; even when 





Weaving, politics, and violence cross paths already in Homer. Both Aristophanes and 
Plato inherit epic lore and with it an image of Penelope, who weaves by day and takes her 
work apart by night, because that is her wily trick to forestall the hotheaded suitors. Odysseys, 
the king of Ithaca, is away and Penelope must find some means of saving herself from being 
forced into a new marriage. If she fails, the power in the kingdom transfers hands. What 
resorts does an ancient Greek queen have when it comes to politics? Homer’s answer is: 
weaving, which in the Odyssey is not merely a woman’s work. Neither is weaving meant to 
mark a simple domestic chore in Aristophanes’ comedy, where the main character’s – 
Lysistrata’s – name picks up on the trope of undoing, unraveling, and dissolving, while her 





choice of an image for doing away with the menace of war is weaving.1 Later still, in Plato’s 
pronouncedly political dialogue – the Statesman – weaving is the paradigm for the royal 
political art. Metaphorical use of weaving, which is the final paradigm for rule in Plato’s 
Statesman, shows a special consonance with Aristophanes’ presentation of weaving in the 
Lysistrata. The connection between the dialogue and the play emerges when we study 
prescriptions of violence, which weaving as the paradigm for rule issues in the Statesman 
(293a – e and 300d), in view of the comedic portrayal of weaving, which Aristophanes’ 
Lysistrata proposes as a political solution to the Peloponnesian War (574 – 86).2 A thorough 
discussion of Plato’s use of paradigms as models in the Statesman is outside of the scope of 
the present analysis. Plato weaves the Statesman out of epos, drama, pre-Socratic thought, 
and out of sophistical arguments and distinctions. However, to discern patterns in Plato’s 
web is not the same as to confine oneself to any one of them. It is difficult to see that weaving 
fails as a solution to the problems of politics, because it is formally akin to Plato’s art. Thus, 
it is especially pressing that we explain why this particular model for rule cannot be meant 
prescriptively in the Statesman.  
Aside from using the same language and imagery as Plato’s dialogue to describe the 
management of a state, what does a vulgar comedy about violence and sex have to do with 
the dialogue’s serious search for the best statesmanship? Recent scholarship on the central 
passages in the Statesman (e.g., on the diaretic searches for the best ruler, Miller 2017; and 
on the mythic time of Cronus, Barney 2011) pays close attention to comedy in Plato. 
Following this research, I go further to prove that unless we recognize Plato’s direct allusion 
to the Lysistrata as it appears in the weaving passages, and through this understanding 
perceive the tragedy revealed thereby, we miss out on a number of serious philosophical 
                                                          
1 I am indebted to Louis Arthur Ruprecht, Jr. for this insight into the parallels between Penelope’s 
unweaving of Odysseys’s funerary cloak and the images of unraveling or dissolution that Lysistrata’s 
name evokes.  
2 On the subject of comedy in general, and more specifically, on the relationship between 
Aristophanes’ plays and Plato, see Freydberg (2008), Strauss (1966), Patterson (1982), and Hyland 
(1995), who warns against distilling from the dialogues some kind of “Plato’s theory of comedy.” 
Instead, Hyland urges us to “look … closely at the dialogues themselves, at the way comedy arises 
within them and the way they portray the philosophic life as comic” Hyland, A. Drew. Finitude and 
Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues (New York: State University of New York Press 1995), 
131. See analyses of Plato’s dialogues as works of drama in Zuckert (2012), Nails (2006), Blondell 
(2002), Freydberg (1997), Arieti (1991), Sallis (1975), Wolz (1963, 1970). 





conclusions that the Statesman offers.3 Comedy, then, far from being merely tangentially 
related to Plato’s thinking, is precisely what avails us of several key insights into his political 
thought. One such insight recommends that we refrain from treating prescriptively such 
dialogical models as the master weaver of the Statesman or the philosopher king of the 
Republic. Both of these, and other dialogical images having to do with model rulers and 
supposedly best regimes, that we find in Plato are rather meant as diagnostic elements; as 
ideas that both reflect and elicit our deepest tendencies and predilections – be they idealistic, 
wishful, self-congratulatory, or coldly calculative in kind.4 Comic self-ridicule is a practice 
attendant upon our capacity to know ourselves. As I bring Aristophanes’ comedy to bear on 
Plato’s dialogue, I aim to make it conducive to an examination of philosophical ideas found 
in the Statesman as well as to our self-examination. Plato’s Statesman is most widely 
considered to be a dialogue about the nature and the possibility of the best government for a 
given state. However, if we put our trust in weaving, as the best form of rule, and aim to 
apply it to our lives, then we miss the point of Plato’s dialogical philosophizing, and end up 
installing tragically violent forms of government against which Plato’s allusions warn.  
 
Review of Literature on Weaving as a Paradigm for Rule in the Statesman 
 
Lane (1998) addresses the relationship between violence and weaving in the 
Lysistrata. However, she suppresses the role of violence in her corresponding treatment of 
the Statesman, where she sees the dialogue as a “technical correction” to Aristophanes’ play. 
The problem with her assessment of the Statesman is that it threatens to prescribe the tyranny 
that Aristophanes’ play intends to have its audience dismiss with laughter. Vetter (2005) 
discusses both the Lysistrata and the Statesman and arrives at the conclusion that 
“Aristophanes serves as an important precursor to Platonic dialectic.”5 However, Vetter does 
                                                          
3 See also essays on the Statesman in a more recent volume. Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, M. Thomas. 
Plato’s Statesman Revisited (Berlin, De Gruyter 2018). 
4 Strauss (1996b) writes that the “action of the Republic can be said to consist in first arousing 
spiritedness or the virtue belonging to it, that is to say, zeal dedicated to non-understood justice, that 
is, what we now mean by political idealism, and then purging it.” Strauss, Leo. “The Origins of 
Political Science and the Problem of Socrates.” Interpretation (1996b) 23(2): 129 – 206, 192. 
5 Vetter, P. Lisa. Women’s Work as Political Art: Weaving and Dialectical Politics in Homer, 
Aristophanes, and Plato (Oxford, UK: Lexington Books 2005), 66. 





not examine the relationship between the two works in terms of their reliance on weaving as 
a metaphor for politics. Miller (1980), although he recognizes that the weaving section 
signals the fact that “the dialogue is in crisis,”6 sees this crisis as a problem that has more to 
do with method than with the upsurge of violence, which the weaving metaphor implies.7 
Sayre (2006) connects the Statesman to the Lysistrata on the basis of weaving and 
differentiates between the use of weaving in the two works. He claims that the comedy lays 
out the “steps” and the dialogue points out the “skills” needful to apply the model to the 
governance of the state.8 Strauss (1966) thinks that the Lysistrata “anticipating the Eleatic 
stranger in Plato’s Statesman [shows] … that the women’s work in handling wool is a perfect 
model for bringing order into the disordered affairs of the city.”9 It looks as if Strauss is 
comfortable with propagating Lysistrata’s tyranny and seeing it applied to politics through 
the insights of Plato’s Statesman. Benardete (2006) explains why it is the case that Strauss 
takes Lysistrata’s “solution” as the Stranger’s answer to political dilemmas when he writes, 
“[t]he woof is the herd, the warp is the ruler, and this interweaving of commandment and 
obedience is the web of political science as the art of caring for the whole city.”10 In the 
alignment of ruler and herd with woof and warp, Benardete brings the myth about the rule of 
                                                          
6 Miller, Mitchell. The Philosopher in Plato’s Statesman (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing 
1980), 64. 
7 Miller’s (2017) recent treatment of weaving in the dialogue confirms the fact that he does not take 
weaving to have anything to do with violence. See Miller, Mitchell. “Nôesis and Logos in the Eleatic 
Trilogy, with a Focus on the Visitor’s Jokes at Statesman 266a-d.” The Plato’s Statesman: Dialectic, 
Myth, and Politics. Sallis, J. ed. (New York, NY: SUNY Press Publishing 2017), 107 – 36, 127 – 28. 
The other authors, who comment on weaving and who are published in the same volume (Günter 
Figal, Eric Sanday, and James Risser) overlook the cruel measures, which weaving as the paradigm 
for rule prescribes. Figal thinks that “weaving proves to be well suited to the task of determining the 
statesman craft.” “On Dialectics in Plato’s Statesman,” 137 – 48, 143. Sanday sets out to prove the 
“success of the paradigm of weaving.” “Paradigm and Dialectical Inquiry in Plato’s Statesman,” 149 
– 70, 155. Risser sees weaving as a model that the interlocutors use in order to practice their skill of 
making and setting up examples. “The Art of the Example in Plato’s Statesman,” 172 – 82, 176. 
8 Sayre, M. Kenneth. Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press 2006), 96. Similarly Smith (2018) in his article entitled “The Groundwork for 
Dialectic in Statesman 277a-287b,” sees weaving, in conjunction with care and due measure, as the 
proper paradigm for the dialectical inquiry.” Smith, C. Collin. “The Groundwork for Dialectic in 
Statesman 277a-287b,” The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition (2018) 12(2): 132 – 50. 
9 Strauss, Leo. Socrates and Aristophanes (New York, NY: Basic Books Publishing 1966a), 202. 
10 Benardete, Seth. The Being of the Beautiful (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 2006), 
III.113. 





Cronus and Zeus (268d – 274e), as well as the pre-mythical rendition of the ruler as the 
herdsman, to bear on the discussion of weaving.  Likewise, Miller wonders about the 
similitude between the divisions that articulate the art of weaving and the “divisions in the 
‘earlier discourse’ [which have] proven unsatisfactory and insufficient.”11 However, having 
expressed their questions and observations, Lane, Sayre, and Strauss proceed to treat the 
discussion of weaving as a cogent model for politics. Whereas, Miller takes it to be a 
necessary step in the young Socrates’ education.12 None of the authors offer an analysis that 
would compare the lines about weaving in the dialogue with those in Aristophanes’ play in 
order to ask the question: What does laughter reveal to us about violence – the violence that 
the play acknowledges is unavoidable if Lysistrata’s weaving and its dialogical counterpart 
are taken up as a serious paradigm for political life? Authors (e.g., Rosen 1995, Rowe 1996, 
De Chiara-Quenzer 1998, Pender 2003, Browning Cole 1991, Moore 2016), who examine 
the meaning of paradigm (παράδειγμα) in the Statesman, and who argue for the important 
role that models play in education, politics, and ethical life do not discuss the possible epic, 
dramatic, or literary examples on which Plato, himself, might have relied to construct the 
weaving paradigm in the Statesman. I seek to correct this oversight and analyze weaving in 
the Lysistrata as the model after which the paradigm for rule takes in Plato’s dialogue.  
 
Politics in the Lysistrata  
 
The shadow of the disastrous Sicilian expedition (413 BC) falls over the first 
performance of the Lysistrata (Λυσιστράτη). The precarious conspiracy of Alcibiades with 
the Spartans and his negotiations with the Persian satrapy help instigate the Athenian 
oligarchs to stage a revolt against the democracy. The oligarchs take power in 411 BC. The 
reign of the four hundred, and then of the five thousand oligarchs, is brief but it marks the 
year in which the Lysistrata – a play about the inanity of war – is produced. In his introduction 
to a study of logos and eros in Aristophanic comedy, Freydberg (2008) interprets the Greeks’ 
                                                          
11 The Philosopher in Plato’s Statesman, 60. 
12 The young Socrates speaks at length in the Statesman. However, the dialogue opens with the 
replicas from old Socrates, who we know as the narrator of the Republic, Lysis, Charmides, 
Euthydemus, and Protagoras. 





warmongering foolishness in the Lysistrata as “the result of male irrationality.”13 We can 
fine-tune Freydberg’s initial suggestion and state that the self-serving shortsightedness of 
particular representatives of the city’s male leaders serves as the laughing stock for the play. 
The Lysistrata conceived in the tumult of the times, albeit playful, relies on the audience’s 
acute awareness of a hardly laughable matter – the pain of war. Vickers (1997) cites a slew 
of scholars who dismiss or undermine the political nature of Aristophanes’ work. He 
attributes this phenomenon to the commentators’ penchant to avoid ambiguity and decry the 
presence of “hidden meanings” in the interpretation of classical works. In the Lysistrata, the 
political meanings are not hidden. They not only surround the play from without; they are 
right at the surface as well. The Lysistrata is explicitly about war, sex, and the city or, to put 
it in less jarringly contemporary terms, it is about polemos, eros, and polis.14  
Strauss (1966), in the first line of his analysis of the Lysistrata, draws our attention 
to the fact that “[t]his is the only play [by Aristophanes] whose title designates a human 
individual. It is the only play whose title designates the chief character or the human being 
responsible for the design that is executed in the play.”15 Aside from wedding the plot to the 
main character’s choices and uniqueness (Lysistrata, after all, is the woman who seeks to do 
away with the war), the name used as the title also suggests that the play’s content is about 
“releasement, liberation, [and] loosening.”16 The name “Lysistrata” evokes as well the sense 
of to “dissolve” or to “break up into parts.” The meaning of the root term (λύειν) is at least 
bi-valent. The name recalls both a resolution or a liberation and a dissolution or a 
disintegration.17 In this double register, the war puts strain onto men, and the men pass it on 
                                                          
13 Freydberg, Bernard. Philosophy and Comedy: Aristophanes, Logos, and Eros (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press 2008), 6. See, further, Freydberg’s chapter on the Lysistrata, 162 – 95.  
14 Vickers, Michael. Pericles on Stage (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press 1997), ix – xx. Vickers 
further reports that Alcibiades resorts to even harsher measures to punish Eupolis’ comedic attacks 
against his persona (xviii). Vickers cites Alcibiades’ 415 BC decree against direct lampooning as the 
reason for Aristophanes’ omission of Alcibiades’ name in his Birds, for instance.  
15 Socrates and Aristophanes, 195. 
16 Freydberg, Philosophy and Comedy, 194. 
17 In some sense, desis is summarily outlined at the outset of the play. The thickening of the action in 
the Lysistrata amounts to the play’s setting; i.e., the war and the resultant sex strike. The whole of the 
Lysistrata, therefore, can be seen as a lusis – as a protracted search for a release of built up tension. 
For the customary meaning of the terms desis and lusis see Aristotle. On Poetics, Benardete, S. and 





to women. To combat this, Lysistrata rallies with Athenian, Boeotian, and Spartan women to 
deny sex to their husbands. Her successful ploy destabilizes also the initial stress-relation. 
Lysistrata’s plan reveals that it is not the war that is the cause of all trouble, but that men 
having engaged in war pain both themselves and their wives. Whereas in reality, the outcome 
of the Peloponnesian war will be anything but pleasant and lighthearted, in the play, 
Lysistrata’s tactic of abstinence prevails and eventually leads to the celebration of life and 
love. However, we note that Lysistrata and her female comrades are ready if need be to set 
not only sex, but also peace aside (574 – 79). On this view, the women are no less apt at 
violence than men. Whether the women desire power or, as Olson (2012) thinks, “dialogue”18 
and change, is not at issue here. The main point is that when pressured the women are capable 
and willing to go as far as men in their choice of violent means to secure the desired end, 
which is paradoxically peace.  
Markedly, Lysistrata offers two kinds of measures that can be taken against the 
inanity of war.19 Lysistrata’s sex solution is one. Another one is her violent or, more 
pointedly, her tyrannical answer to the proliferation of the warmongering moods of men. 
Lysistrata’s second solution is presented as the metaphor of weaving (567 – 86). The play 
laughs it off, but Plato’s dialogue makes weaving into a paradigm for politics. Plato’s 
                                                          
Davis, M. trans. (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press 2002), chapters 15, 25, and pages xxvii – 
xxviii.  
18 Olson, S. Douglas. “Lysistrata's Conspiracy and the Politics of 412 BC,” No Laughing Matter: 
Studies in Athenian Comedy. Marshall, W. C. and Kovacs, G. eds. (London, UK:  
Bristol Classical Press 2012), 69 – 81. See, also, Vickers’s Aristophanes and Alcibiades: Echoes of 
Contemporary History in Athenian Comedy (Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter Publishing 2015), 119 
– 20, where Vickers argues against Whitman and with Mastromarco, who understands Lysistrata’s 
character as taking on a masculine, if not also a power-seeking role. 
19 In the Statesman, the Stranger’s and the young Socrates’ discussion of bigness (284e – 286b) and 
length (286b – 286e), which supersedes the Stranger’s divvying up of the “art of measurement” 
(284e), ends up preferring the “fitting” as the measurement appropriate to “make our blame and praise 
of brevity and length” (βραχύτητος ἅμα καὶ μήκους, 286c). The comparison “by judging [the] … 
lengths relative to one another” (286c) is set aside and so is “any fitting length relative to pleasure” 
(πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν, 286d). The Stranger suggests that pleasure is irrelevant in measuring the “fitting 
length” (μήκους ἁρμόττοντος, 286d). For detailed discussions about the difference between the art of 
measurement and essential measure, consult Miller (1980, 71 – 2), Sayre (2006, 145 – 89), and Krell, 
David. “Talk to the Animals: On the Myth of Cronus in the Statesman.” Plato’s Animals: Gadflies, 
Horses, Swans, and Other Philosophical Beasts. Naas, M. ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press 2015), 35. 





Statesman ends up preferring exactly that, which the Lysistrata dismisses. As the dialogue 
settles on weaving, it welcomes the kind of brutality in politics, which the erotic denouement 
of Aristophanes’ comedy avoids. The main characters’ take on weaving suppresses the fact 
that is apparent in Lysistrata’s example. In the Lysistrata, weaving has to do with putting 
together human coalitions and dissolving human lives. Lysistrata is using weaving as a 
metaphor for quieting the disarray of war and restoring order. The image of worked over 
woven wool portrays her view of a well-ordered polis. Lysistrata asks us to  
[i]magine the polis as a fleece just shorn. First put it in a bath and wash out all the sheep dung; spread 
it on a bed and beat out the riff-raff with a stick [ἐκραβδίζειν] and pluck out the thorns; as for those 
who clump and knot themselves to snag government positions, card them out and pluck off their 
heads [ διαξῆναι καὶ τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀποτῖλαι]. Next, card the wool into a sewing basket of unity and 
goodwill, mixing [καταμιγνύντας] everyone. 574 – 7920 
Lysistrata’s metaphor prescribes executions, torture, and exile as well as the forced 
mixing of the “cleansed” peoples. Her political prescriptions are hardly democratic and they 
are certainly violent. Aristophanes has history as an example for his play. Consider for 
example the Athenian expulsion of the Hestiaeans and the consequent establishment of an 
Athenian colony on Oreus (446 – 445BC) or Pericles’ punitive mission to Samos (440 – 
439BC), where the oligarchs’ attempt to snuff out democracy was expediently, violently, in 
short – undemocratically – put down.     
 
The Role of Aristophanes’ Play in the Statesman  
 
Let us consider next the textual resonances between weaving as a metaphor for rule 
in the Lysistrata and in the Statesman. Socrates agrees when the Stranger offers that  
regardless of whether [it is] … in conformity with laws or without laws [ἐάντε κατὰ νόμους ἐάντε 
ἄνευ νόμων ἄρχωσι], and over willing or unwilling (subjects) [ἑκόντων ἢ ἀκόντων]. … And so 
regardless of whether they purge the city for the good by killing [ἀποκτεινύντες] some or maybe 
exiling [ἐκβάλλοντες], or they make the city smaller by sending out colonies somewhere like swarms 
of bees, or they increase it by importing some different people from somewhere or other outside and 
making them citizens, as long as they are employing science and the just and, in keeping safe, make 
                                                          
20 Aristophanes. Birds; Lysistrata; Women at the Thesmophoria. (Loeb Classical Library No. 
179). Aristophanis Comoediae. Henderson, J. trans. (Oxford, UK: Oxford Classical Texts 2000), 349. 





it better from worse to the best of their ability, we must state that this then is the only right regime. 
293c – e21 
The Stranger’s meaning is unambiguous. Only the rulers have the “know-how” 
(τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας, 293c) or the true knowledge of the art by which the 
state is supposed to be run. The use of extreme violence (killing and exiling) against the 
population is justified even if it is not permitted in the written laws and even if the citizens 
disagree with the decrees and actions of the rulers. Notice the close similarity between these 
lines from the dialogue and the violence prescribed by the weaving scene in the Lysistrata 
(565 – 86), where she says: 
Well, first as we wash dirty wool so as to cleanse it, so with a pitiless zeal we will scrub. Through the 
whole city for all greasy fellows; burrs too, the parasites, off we will rub. That verminous plague of 
those degenerate refugees soon between thumb … we'll crack. All who inside Athens' walls have 
their dwelling into one great common basket we'll pack. Disenfranchised or citizens, allies or aliens, 
pell-mell the lot of them in we will squeeze. … As for disjointed and far colonies, Them you must 
never from this time imagine as scattered about just like loose strands of wool. Each portion we'll 
take and wind in to this centre, inward to Athens loyal and true, Till from the vast heap where all is 
piled together at last can be woven a strong Cloak of State [τῷ δήμῳ χλαῖναν ὑφῆναι]. (574 – 86)22 
Both the Stranger and Lysistrata advocate for the harsh treatment of the citizens. In 
both cases there is a method that the ones who rule employ. The passage in which Lysistrata 
suggests that women know how to run the city because they know the art of weaving 
mentions the separation of “grease and filth” from the fabric. This is her metaphor for driving 
out “bad citizens” (574 – 76).23 Stretching, scourging, carding “matted coalitions,”24 and 
plucking off “head clumps”25 is used as an analogy of separating out and preparing the shorn 
wool for being worked over into suitable material. The mixing of the desirable parts that 
follows is cast less metaphorically. Lysistrata says,  
                                                          
21 Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful, III.46. 
22 Aristophanes. Lysistrata. Lindsay, J. trans. (London, UK: Fanfrolico Press 1926). 
23 Here, I am using an anonymous translation of the Lysistrata. Crofts, T. ed. (New York, NY: Dover 
Publishing 1994).  
24 This is how Benardete translates lines 574 – 77 from the Lysistrata in The Being of the Beautiful, 
III.153, nt. 29. 
25 Ibid. 





Gather into a basket the shared good will of all, mixing together the metics, any friendly stranger, and 
anyone who solely owes money to the treasury. … [T]he cities, those which are your colonies, 
adjudicate with discernment, because they now lie apart like flock. And then from all of them … 
weave a cloak for the people. 580 – 8626  
The Magistrate’s (Πρόβουλος) response to this solution to the conflict is – dismissal 
(587 – 88). Yet, instead of objecting to its violence (we are, after all, talking about murder, 
torture, coercion, forced mingling and separation of peoples, and redistribution of property), 
the old man dismisses it on the grounds that it is … weaving! He is put off by the suggestion 
that the management of the polis is akin to a woman’s work. The aged Magistrate exclaims: 
“Is it not shameful that they treat all” of the affairs of the city by “thrashing and by winding?” 
(οὔκουν δεινὸν ταυτὶ ταύτας ῥαβδίξειν καὶ τολυπεύειν, 587). Such a response shows up the 
Magistrate’s incompetence. The old man’s response is funny. However, it is not funny that 
Lysistrata intends, if necessary, to end the war not by a peaceful sex strike, but in accordance 
with this much crueler plan.  
Lysistrata gives a name to the paradigm for the forced disenfranchisement, 
resettlement, purging, and mixing of the peoples. She calls it “weaving” (ὑφάω, 586). The 
Stranger, in the Statesman, adopts the same root term for the skilled ruler and calls him a 
“weaver” (ὑφαντικός, 280e). The weaving paradigm undergoes several permutations in the 
Statesman, moving away from the matters that are directly related to the craft of weaving and 
toward the matters that are related to the politics of state. However, the continuity between 
weaving as a craft and statesmanship (which is based on the model of weaving) is preserved 
until the end. The passages that relate to weaving most immediately are at 279a – e. The 
Stranger establishes a direct analogy between cloak making, which is the product of weaving, 
and statesmanship at 280a. The Stranger recommends that statesmanship : state :: clothes-
making : clothes and, furthermore, that “weaving differs in no other way, but in its name 
from the art of clothes-making” [ὑφαντικήν ... μηδὲν διαφέρειν πλὴν ὀνόματι ταύτης τῆς 
ἱματιουργικῆς, 280a].27 Thereafter, he identifies the more general arts that the city dwellers 
practice and compares these to the specific arts, which go into weaving (280a – e). At 288a 
– e, the list of arts that are specific to the needs of the city is enlarged. There, the Stranger 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Translation by the author. 





recommends again that in separating the art of the statesman from the other arts we should 
follow the analogy with weaving (279a – 290a). That analogy identifies “the arts that were 
supplying tools for weaving as co-causes” (287c). This, further, allows us to examine the 
productive arts that keep the city running with an eye on understanding how to differentiate 
between the craftsmen who have the know-how of their art and the charlatans (299a – e). The 
ruler who directs and oversees the work of the auxiliary craftsmen is the perfect statesman 
(280e, 311a – c). Although, the ruler himself might not engage in the preparatory and 
auxiliary crafts, he organizes the city based on the same principle as the weaver uses when 
he runs together the woof and the warp (281a, 282d – 283b, 305e – 311c).28 The Stranger 
tells us that the ruler’s art – if it is properly political – ought to be able to weave everything 
together in the city perfectly or correctly (συνυφαίνουσαν ὀρθότατα, 305e). Whatever else 
the statesman may turn out to be on this paradigm, he is the master weaver and therefore the 
violence of the auxiliary arts accrues to him. However, we see this violence clearly only if 
we look closely at Lysistrata’s description of the sorts of things that go into making the 
material out of which to weave the cloak of state (disenfranchisement, forced resettlement, 
exiles, killings, forced mixings, etc.). The master weaver weaves the state together on the 
basis of violence required to produce the clean yarn and the suitable fabric. 
Both Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, who describes how the yarn must be prepared in order 
to finally weave the “Cloak of State” and Plato’s Stranger, who goes over the sorts of 
activities that are needful for the paradigm of the statesman-weaver, tread close to ancient 
history. Burckhardt (1998) refers us to synoecism – a process by which a “locality usually 
already settled, but not previously fully fortified” was established. It was a necessary, but as 
Burckhardt explains, an oftentimes painful political solution, which aimed to match the 
growing power of neighboring communities. Burckhardt traces the polis with its 
governmental structure of “prytaneis (councillors) and … archontes (chief administrators) 
and … council bouleuterion” back to synoecism and posits that without this practice, “the 
full development of Greek culture would not have been conceivable.”29 He draws on “the 
clearly recorded examples of the historical period [from which] … we learn of the sacrifices 
                                                          
28 See Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful, III.113. 
29 Burckhardt, Jacob. The Greeks and Greek Civilization (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press 1998), 
45. 





this synoechism might cost: violent resettlements of resisting populations or their 
extermination. What can only be guessed at is the misery of the many who complied.”30 In 
Aristophanes’ play, Lysistrata hearkens back to a synoecism of sorts in order to, 
simultaneously, punish the wrongdoers and bring order to the polis. However in the dialogue, 
the weaving of the statesman, which necessarily includes the auxiliary (and as I argue on the 
example of the Lysistrata) violent arts, need not be a response to the troubled times, but rather 
a prophylactic, i.e., a preemptive organizing measure. Burckhardt goes on to say about 
synoecism that “[t]hese measures must usually have been carried out by powerful tyrannical 
minorities.”31 This historical fact does not exonerate the measures of strengthening the polis 
and of ruling it, as weavers do, which the Stranger proposes in the Statesman. Instead, set 
against the backdrop of synoecism, the Eleatic Stranger’s weaving paradigm looks all the 
more menacing. It suggests that the Stranger has tyranny in mind. 
What are we to make of the license that the Stranger attributes to the master weavers 
at 300d? He says: “the statesman will … do many things by his art, as far as his own action 
goes, without any regard for the writings, whenever he is of the opinion that, contrary to what 
has been written by him … different things are better” (300d). We may be talking here about 
prudent choices, which are not prescribed or anticipated by the written law, but for which a 
given situation calls. Indeed, further conversation circles around to the matter of the truth and 
knowledge of political science (300d – 301d). However, if we consider that the many cannot 
rule well and that, therefore, there must only be a few or even but a single ruler; and if, 
moreover, we remember that the sorts of things that the rulers do (based on their knowledge 
of truth and craft) include acts of violence (unconstrained by law) against the ruled (293d – 
e), then we are faced with the conclusion that weaving is prescribed as beneficial, but that it 
is implicitly harmful.  
Whereas the characters of the comedy scoff at the violent solution to the violence of 
war, in the dialogue the Stranger goes on to adopt and prescribe artful violence. The 
presentation of weaving as a craft works over the elements, which make up the polis. The 
divisionary and combinatory remixing is called the “royal art” (280a). The Stranger tells us 
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that it “does not at all differ except in name from … cloakmaking” (280a), which is the 
“political art” (280a). The master-craft – the royal art – is weaving. Cloakmaking is politics.32  
As Strauss observes about the Lysistrata, “[t]he women do not deny that they intend 
to set up tyranny.”33  However, once the men agree to peace the threat of tyranny is abated. 
This is not the case in the Statesman. On the contrary, because the best king rules by art and 
often without regard for the written laws, ancestral customs, and those things that are 
perceived as being good by the many (297a – d), the line between the best kingship and 
tyranny is easily erased. All that it takes for the tyrant to rise to power is that he pretend to 
be as knowledgeable about rule as the best king is supposed to be (301c – d). In fact, just as 
the best king is said to do also the tyrant “acts neither in conformity with laws nor in 
conformity with usages, and … he pretends, just as if he were the knower [that] … the best 
has to be done contrary to what has been written” (301c) down. The Lysistrata is funny 
because it does not claim to have secured a safe distance and a means of distinguishing 
between tyrannical acts and intentions and those of well-meaning individuals. The comedian 
exposes the shaky and duplicitous foundations of the supposed righteousness of violent acts. 
The woman who wants to end the war is accused of hubris and rightly so. She proposes 
killings as a means of untangling the warp of animosity. In effect, Lysistrata’s weaving 
solution aims to redirect the aggression of war and aim it at the incompetent and corrupt 
natives of the city. Yet, her threats remain empty, all ends well, and we laugh. By contrast, 
the truth of Plato’s and Aristophanes’ own political situation is that the Athenians are both 
all too serious in their pursuit of militaristic expansion and that they fail to rise up against the 
violent executions of their own citizens (e.g., the aftermath of the battle of Arginusae). 
Unmoved by the self-reflection that Aristophanic laughter intends to bring about, the city 
                                                          
32 If we follow the Stranger’s alignment of warp and woof (282e – 283a) and Benardete’s (2006) 
reflection on the metaphorical implications that ensue (The Being of the Beautiful, III.113), we notice 
that the relationship between the people and the ruler (the woof and the warp) has been modified since 
the introduction of the herdsman metaphor and the development thereof in the Stranger’s myth (268e 
– 275a). The ruler is no longer separated from the herd as a divine overseer. The invocation of Athena 
and Hephaestus and the reiteration of Prometheus’ myth (274c – d) prepare the ground for taking up 
art as the paradigm for the science of statesmanship. Since Athena is subservient to the blacksmith-
god (274c), wisdom is made to serve craftsmanship. Miller is right to observe that Plato is giving us 
the paradigm of “weaving [that] mirrors the dialogue as a whole” (The Philosopher in Plato’s 
Statesman, 60). 
33 Socrates and Aristophanes, 204. 










We see that weaving as the paradigm for rule in the Statesman is problematic if we 
trace this model back to its comedic roots. The comedy that throws a wrench into the 
systematic argumentation and into those forms of order, which are derived from it gives us a 
sense of the disorderly. Instead of seeing this disorder as threatening anarchy and mysology, 
or even as an intimation of the meaninglessness of life, we could see the lesson of comedy 
as I articulated it in my analysis of the dialogue.  
Laughter avails us of a distance from ourselves and, thereby, allows us to move closer 
to serious self-understanding without which we cannot give due care to our political life. 
How can one engage in politics and public life thoughtfully, if one does not expend much 
thought in an attempt to know oneself? In the Philebus, Socrates speaks about the “nature of 
the ridiculous” (τὸ γελοῖον … φύσιν, Philebus 48c)34 as a “kind of vice [πονηρία] that derives 
its name from a special disposition; it is, among all the vices, the one with a character that 
stands in direct opposition to the one recommended by the famous inscription in Delphi” 
(48c). The inscription at the entrance to the temple of Delphic Apollo commands: “Know 
Thyself.” Socrates’ joke, here, hinges on the fact that the ridiculous stands in direct 
opposition to our self-knowledge. Comedy makes use of our personal downfalls and faults 
to which we are either purposefully or unknowingly blind. Our quirks, our strong convictions 
and predilections are funny precisely when we take them seriously; more seriously than we 
should. Yet, the vice to which Socrates points, is vice strictly only if we remain in the 
condition of denying ourselves the possibility to laugh at ourselves, to see through the 
blinding effects of both our good intentions, and our problematic habits. Comedy and the 
Delphic injunction, work in tandem. The latter is a life-long exercise that is then serious, 
when it is ongoing, and when it seeks, but does not claim completion. The former – comedy 
that is – is only then vicious when it makes light of our downfalls while arousing no impetus 
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to reflect on the implications of our limited and finite nature. Of course, in that guise, it is no 
longer comedy, but rather something gratuitously grotesque and even tragic. If good comedy, 
or put better, if comedy that is well received, reveals to us both the vulnerable and the 
dangerous aspects of being human and thereby welcomes us to a serious study of ourselves, 




Marina Marren  
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